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Abstract
The theory of competitive auctions o¤ers a coherent framework for
modelling coordination frictions as a non-cooperative game. The the-
ory represents an advancement over cooperative approaches that make
exogenous assumptions about how output is divided between buyers
and sellers and about the forces that bring buyers and sellers into local
markets. Moreover, unlike price posting models, which x the terms
of trade prior to matching, competitive auction models have a bidding
process that allocates the good (or service) to the highest valuation
bidder at a price equal to the second highest valuation. Therefore, the
competing auction model is more robust to problems in which there
are heterogenous valuations. This paper develops the theory of com-
petitive auctions and applies it to a number of practical problems in
microeconomics, labor economics, industrial organization, investment
theory and monetary economics.
1 Introduction
At the heart of every economic theory is a description of how people ex-
change. Economists generally choose between one of two possible extremes:
Walrasian or random matching. In the Walrasian extreme the cost of com-
munication between buyers and sellers is assumed to be zero. Therefore,
The goal of this survey is to introduce my research to students and professors at the
University of Copenhagen with the hope that this exchange of knowledge will aid research
based teaching initiatives. I also hope that this survey will prove to be of interest to the
wider academic community, because the methods described are quite general and have
broad application.
yE-mail: john.robert.kennes@econ.ku.dk
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buyers and sellers in a Walrasian economy need only report their character-
istics to a central mechanism designer and a set of transfers are then carried
out using this information.1 At the opposite extreme is random matching.
In random matching models the cost of communication is assumed to be
almost insurmountable. Instead, buyers and sellers are brought together
by an exogenous matching technology and only then can they communicate
with their potential trading partner(s).
Recent research has developed models in which trade is neither Walrasian
nor random matching. These so-called directed search models allow a range
of communications that falls within the extremes of Walrasian and random
matching environments. For example, in a directed search model we might
assume that a set of similar sellers can easily communicate their locations to
buyers, but we might also assume that buyers cannot communicate with each
other over which seller to visit. This type of model has equilibrium mixed
strategies for buyers concerning their location decision over sellers. These
mixed strategy equilibrium are a useful method to describe the di¢ culties
of coordination in large decentralized markets. Thus the early applications
of these models have been to the theory of unemployment.
Directed search models confront a number of modelling issues that are
not found in either Walrasian or random matching environments. The basic
premise is that the selling mechanism of each seller matters for both price
and probability of trade with buyers. This result is not assumed as in
models of monopolistic competition, but is instead derived as the outcome
of a market with coordination frictions. For example, in this paper I derive a
simple static model of competitive auctions with sellers setting reserve prices.
In a small market, the sellers set positive reserve prices. However, in the
limit as the market is made large, I show that the equilibrium reserve price
at each auction is equal to zero. In other words competition leads to a very
simple selling mechanism. The rest of this survey of competitive auctions is
dedicated to showing that this basic model has many applications.
A useful application of this framework is a dynamic model of the labor
market in which the reserve price of sellers - workers - is equal to their outside
option. This model o¤ers a very tractable alternative to Pissarides (2000)
of the labor market. The model also avoids making assumptions that are
foreign to conventional general equilibrium theory. In particular, Pissarides
assumes that wages are determined by an exogenous Nash bargaining rule
and that the arrival rate of meetings is determined by an exogenous match-
ing technology. These elements are endogenized in a competitive auction
1This central gure is often referred to as the Walrasian auctioneer.
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framework.
A surprisingly robust feature of competitive auction equilibrium is ef-
ciency. The basic premise that auctions generate e¢ ciency in random
matching games was rst advanced by Mortensen (1982). The Mortensen
rule, roughly stated, is that the surplus of a match should go to the iniator
of a match. I show how the Mortensen rule can be stated as a set of ax-
ioms that give outcomes equivalent to competitive auctions without reserve
prices. I also show that this axiomatic rule gives e¢ ciency in a set of match-
ing games for which the well known Hosios rule fails. These games include
markets of nite size, where the matching technology displays decreasing
returns to scale and markets with heterogenous buyers where the match-
ing technology contains more than to arguments. These examples illustrate
that competitive auctions are not subject to a holdup problem and they also
introduce the possibility of e¢ cient technology dispersion.
Competitive auction theory o¤ers a very simple framework in which to
study endogenous job destruction. This problem is di¢ cult to study in
an alternative frameworks such as price posting models with coordination
frictions, because the posted prices always leave on-the-job searchers never
completely satised they are always looking for more. The auction mecha-
nism gives them what they want - everything - but only if they have multiple
o¤ers in the type of job they are currently in. Therefore, competitive auc-
tions o¤ers a much more tractable theory of on-the-job search. To illustrate
I extend the basic dynamic model to have (i) heterogenous jobs that are
distinguished by their productivity and capital cost and (ii) heterogenous
job searcher who are distinguished by their employment status. On-the-job
search leads to wage changes as workers move into higher productivity jobs.
The equilibrium is also constrained e¢ cient.
Many models of competitive auction treat the identity of buyers and
sellers as exogenous. This is not an innocuous assumption. Suppose that
there are two types of agents - red and blue - that are to be matched. The
question is what characteristics of red and blue agents causes one type to be
the seller. I identify two separate causal elements. First, I show red agents
are likely to be buyers if they are more numerous than blue agents. Second,
I show that red agents are likely to be buyers if they are heterogenous and
blue agents are homogenous. Therefore, endogenizing the choice of who
is the seller leads to a market in which heterogenous buyers search over
homogenous sellers.
I also evaluate closely related models of coordination frictions with price
posting. These model works well if (i) buyers are homogenous and (ii)
buyer-seller relationships are stable by assumption. In this case, the auction
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and price posting models are equivalent. However, many di¢ culties arise
if buyers are heterogenous. In particular, even in a static model, in order
to gain equivalence with e¢ cient competitive auctions, a very complicated
discriminatory price posting structure must be adopted by sellers. Moreover,
if valuations are determined ex post by nature, then the predetermined terms
of trade dictated by a posted prices are inevitably ine¢ cient.
I also consider the wage implications of competitive auction models. The
solution of a competitive auction model yields an expression for the present
value of a worker at a job. However, it is also straightforward to derive the
implications of this present value for wages. Therefore, it is easy to show
that a model without on-the job search does not yield much wage dispersion.
Moreover, it can also be shown that the model can explain much wage
dispersion if on-the-job search is permitted. The other issue about wages is
the outcome of competitive auctions in markets with small frictions. I show
that removing frictions from the model leads to a Walrasian outcome in
which workers are paid their marginal product. This exercise of comparing
the limiting properties of models with frictions to Walrasian outcomes was
advanced by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Gale (1986). Gale argues
that this exercise is an important test of how reasonable the assumptions
are of the matching game specied.
The theory of competitive auctions implies a shift in focus from imperfect
information about buyers to imperfect information about sellers. On the one
hand, the problem of informational ine¢ ciency concerning buyers is solved
by the auction and thus the high valuation buyer is always rewarded the
good for sale at a price equal to the second highest valuation. On the other
hand, the sellersproblem of attracting buyers gives them much incentive
to advertise themselves as good - a classic lemons problem. Therefore, I
consider the e¤ects of exogenously lifting the veil of ignorance about the
quality of sellers. This application shows that third party information is
used e¢ ciently but that there are important distributional considerations.
I show that buyers are always made worse o¤ by small additions to their
information set, but can be beneted by a su¢ ciently large addition.
There are a number of other applications of competitive auctions. I
attempt to briey summarize a number of these applications. The list is by
no means exhaustive and is meant to o¤er suggestions about how the theory
might be applied.
I caution that the present paper does not attempt to advance the theory
of competitive search by Shimer (1996) and Moen (1997). The theory of
competitive search derives a number of very similar results as competitive
auction theory, but for a very di¤erent reason. In particular, the theory
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of competitive search obtains e¢ ciency in matching by the assumption of
middlemen who oversee frictional submarkets and set the terms of trade in
each. This concept runs into di¢ culties if buyers are hetergeneous. For
example. in a price posting model, Shi (2004) shows that, if buyers are
heterogenous, the optimal equilibrium decision of sellers requires a vector
of ex ante prices - with each price corresponding to the unique valuation of
each type of buyer. Moreover, he shows that these pricing announcements
need not be monotonic. In particular, sellers may post lower prices for high
valuation buyers than for low valuation buyers. The competitive auction
model is a much simpler framework, because prices are determined ex post
and there is no need to solve a complicated multi-dimensional ex ante pricing
game. It also seems more realistic, because the sale of unique goods and
services, such as specialized labor or specialized jobs, is rarely done by posted
price (ref: Gautier and Moraga-Gonzalas 2004).
The paper is organized into 8 analytical sections that demonstrate a
number of the main results. I then provide a section on further applications
where I discuss a number of other contributions to the theory and I attempt
to link these results to ideas presented in the preceding sections. The nal
section o¤ers concluding remarks.
2 Competitive Auctions
This section considers a simple game of competitive auctions described in
Julien, Kennes and King (2000).2 This model introduces the optimal auction
of each seller as a choice of reserve price. The coordination frictions arise
in the mixed strategy equilibrium of this game. The model illustrates an
important result that competition among sellers tends to reduce their reserve
prices. In the game presented here, the reserve price is driven to zero in the
limit as the number of buyers and sellers is large. The fact that prices cease
to play a role in a large market is an important simplication, because this
it implies that decentralized trade with auctions can be modelled as an ex
post pricing game. Many of the models of this survey use this simplication.
2.1 The model
There are N identical sellers and M identical buyers, all spatially separated.
Each seller has one good for sale worth y to any buyer and worth 0 to the
2The seminal contributions to competitive auctions are Wolinsky (1988) and McAfee
(1993). Peters (1984) and Montgomery (1991) introduce the basic problem as a price
posting game.
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seller. All agents are risk neutral and maximize expected income. Buyers
can choose the location of only one seller. The sequence of events within the
period is as follows. First, each seller announces a reserve price to induce
visits from buyers. Buyers then decide which seller to approach. Sellers then
auction the good to the highest bidder.
2.2 The bidding game
We start with the bidding game for, and given each sellers announced re-
serve price ri where i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng is used to denote sellers. Let mi 2
f0; 1; 2; :::;Mg denote the number of buyers bidding at seller i and let w(ri;mi)
denote the equilibrium price obtained by seller i. As is standard in an
ascending-bid auction with homogenous buyers and complete information,
the sellers price is given by
w(ri;mi) =
8<:
0
ri
y
if mi = 0
if mi = 1
if mi > 1
(2.1)
Clearly, if no buyer approaches the seller, his price is zero. If only one
buyer approaches, then the candidate receives his reserve price ri. If more
then one buyer approaches then Bertrand competition between buyers drives
the price up to the point where the seller receives all the gains that the buyer
makes from owning the good, y.
2.3 Buyers choice of seller to bid for
Having observed the sellersreserve price announcement vector, buyers de-
cide which seller to bid for. Since we will be focusing on symmetric equi-
libria, for notational convenience we will assume that all sellers other than
i choose the same reserve price r. Let pi(ri; r) denote the probability that
a particular buyer bids for seller i. Thus, for any buyer, the probabilities
must sum to one, and given mi sellers at seller i, the probability that seller
i will accept any o¤er is given by Prfi acceptsg = 1=mi. Once the buyer
decides to locate at seller i, given mi, the expected payo¤ to this buyer is
Ri = (y w(ri;mi)) Prfi accepts w(ri;mi)g, which is y ri ifmi = 1 and 0 if
mi > 1. In a symmetric equilibrium (1 pi(ri; r))M 1 is the probability that
the buyer will be alone in his o¤er to candidate i, and [1 (1 pi(ri; r))M 1]
is the probability that at least one other will make this seller an o¤er. Hence,
before knowing mi, the buyers expected payo¤ if she makes an o¤er to seller
i is
i(ri; r) = (1  pi(ri; r))M 1(y   ri): (2.2)
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In a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, each buyer chooses pi(ri; r); i =
1; 2; :::; N; so that i(ri; r) = . Let p(ri; r) denote the symmetric mixed
strategy probability assigned to all other sellers, the the constraint that the
location probabilities sum to one implies p(ri; r) = (1  pi(ri; r)) =(N   1).
Using this constraint and (2.2) one obtains
pi(ri; r) = 1  N   1
1 + (N   1)

y ri
y r
1=M 1 (2.3)
2.4 Sellersreserve price choice
Sellers choose their reserve price to maximize their expected payo¤s in a
simultaneous moves game with other sellers. Let qi0(ri; r) = (1  pi(ri; r))M
and qi1(ri; r) = Mpi(ri; r)(1   pi(ri; r))M 1 denote the probabilities that
seller i will receive zero o¤ers and one o¤er, respectively. The expected
payo¤ function for seller i is therefore given by
Vi(ri; r) = qi1(ri; r)ri + (1  qi0(ri; r)  qi1(ri; r)) y: (2.4)
Since sellers choose their reserve prices simultaneously, an equilibrium array
of reserve prices is found by a standard Nash argument, ri = argmaxri
Vi(ri; r
).
The symmetric Nash Equilibrium is
ri = r
 =
(M   1)
(M   1) + (N   1)2 y (2.5)
2.5 A large market
We now consider the properties of this equilibrium, as the scale of the market
become large. To do this, we hold the ratio of buyers to sellers constant,
 = M=N; and examine the case where N is very large, but nite number.
In this type of environment the economy can be closely approximated by the
limit economy here N!1. In the large economy, the reserve price becomes
zero.3
r = 0 (2.6)
The matching technology in a large market is given by
x(N;M) = N(1  e ); (2.7)
3McAfee and McMillan (1985) derive a similar result in a model of endogenous buyer
entry with a monopoly auction.
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which is the familiar urn ball matching function. The expected payo¤ to the
representative buyer is () = e y, which states that the buyer is paid y
if she is alone in her o¤er, which occurs with frequency e . Likewise, the
expected payo¤ of the representative seller is V () =
 
1  e    ()e  y,
which states that the seller gets y if he has multiple o¤ers, which occurs
with frequency 1  e    e .
3 Dynamics
This section derives a dynamic model of competitive auctions in which work-
ers auction their services to rms. Here, we assume that the reserve price
of each workers auction is equal to their outside option, even though this
assumption can be derived explicitly as an equilibrium outcome as is done
in Julien, Kennes and King (2000). The model is similar to the basic model
of Pissarides (2000). However, we do not need to specify exogenous sharing
rulesor matching functions. These aspects of the model are derived en-
dogenously. The only friction in the competitive auction model is the length
of time between o¤er rounds.
3.1 The Model
Consider a simple economy in which N identical workers face an innite
horizon, perfect capital markets and a common discount factor . At the
start of each period t = 0; 1; 2; ::; there are N   Et displaced workers of
productivity y0 = 0 and Et workers employed in jobs of productivity y1 =
y > 0. The ratio ofMt job vacancies to job searchers (i.e. displaced workers)
is
t =
Mt
(N   Et) (3.1)
Each of the vacant jobs carries a capital cost k per job per period. Each
worker can work at most one job and one job can employ at most one worker.
Furthermore, any match in the current period may dissolve in the subsequent
period with probability . The job vacancies are randomly assigned to job
searchers. Therefore, the net addition of Ht workers is given by the follow-
ing matching technology: Ht = (N   Et)(1   e t), where 1   e t is the
probability the worker obtains at least one o¤er. The exogenous separations
at the end of the period imply that the supply employed workers at the start
of next period is given by Et+1 = (1  )(Et +Ht).
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The labor market is decentralized with each worker using a second price
auction for their labor services. Within each period, the order of play is as
follows. At the beginning of the period, given the state, new vacancies enter.
Once the number of entrants has been established, vacancies choose which
workers to approach. Once new vacancies have been assigned to candidates,
wages are determined through the auction mechanism. Let i denote the
expected discounted surplus of a match between an unemployed worker and
a job of productivity yi at the start of the period (where a job of productivity
y0 = 0 is of course the unemployed state - home production). A second price
auction implies that the workers share W ji of the total surplus i is equal
to the surplus j of the workers second best available job o¤er. Thus
W ji = j (3.2)
The randomness of the number of jobs at each displaced worker implies that
the present value of a displaced worker is given by
Vt = p
0
t0t + p
1
t1t (3.3)
where p01t = e
 t +te t is the probability the worker has either one or no
job o¤ers in the current period and p1t = 1  e t  te t is the probability
of multiple o¤ers in which case the workers second best o¤er is a job of
productivity y1. The supply of rms is determined by free entry such that
rms earn zero prots in equilibrium. Thus the expected prot t of a rm
opening a job is given by
t = maxfq0t (1t   0t)  k; 0g: (3.4)
where q0t = e
 t is the probability the buyer of labor (the rm) is alone in
its o¤er to the worker in the current period. The value of a displaced worker
that does not nd a job is given by
0t = Vt+1 (3.5)
and the value of a worker that is employed is given by 1t = y + [Vt +
(1 )y]+2(1 )[Vt+1+(1 )y]+ :::which in a steady state is given by
1 =
y + V
1  (1  ) (3.6)
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3.2 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the supply of job vacancies is given by
k =
y
1  p0(1  ) e
  (3.6)
This equations states thate the vacancy cost must be o¤set by the probability
the seller is alone in its o¤er times an appropriately discounted ow of returns
equal to y each period. The equilibrium unemployment rate is given by
u = e =
 
1  (1  )e .
4 E¢ ciency
Julien, Kennes and King (2003) apply an axiomatic approach to the e¢ -
ciency of markets in which the participants in local markets are determined
by coordination frictions. This approach is taken from Mortensen (1982)
who uses it in a di¤erent context. Mortensens axioms are useful here,
because the outcome of these axioms is an auction without reserve price.
Therefore, we can use apply these axioms to the game presented previously
and to its natural extensions to heterogenous buyers. In both cases, we will
show that the Mortensen rule gives e¢ ciency. Moreover, in these games,
the well known axioms of Hosios (1990) do not apply. This section will also
illustrate why the competitive auction framework is not subject to a hold
up problem and why endogenous technology dispersion - the endogenous
heterogenous valuation of buyers - is e¢ cient.
4.1 E¢ cient entry
There are N identical sellers and M identical buyers, all spatially separated.
Each seller has one good for sale worth y to any buyer and worth 0 to the
seller. All agents are risk neutral and maximize expected income. Buyers are
randomly allocated to sellers. Therefore, the expected number of matches
is given by
x(N;M) = N(1  (1  1=N)M ) (4.1)
The matching function has decreasing returns to scale, but in the limit where
N and M are large, it has the function form given by equation 2.7, which
displays constant returns to scale.
Let m 2 f0; 1; 2; :::;Mg denote the number of buyers bidding at a seller.
A local market contains one seller S and a set of identical buyers, B =
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(B1; B2; :::; Bm) if m > 1 and no buyers if m = 0.4 The surplus of a match
between the seller and any particular buyer Bi is given by
(S;Bi) = V (S;Bi)  ds(B)  di(B) (4.2)
where V (S;Bi) is the total value of the match, ds(B) is the threat point of
the seller, and di(B) is the threat point of the buyer. The total valuation of
a match is given by V (S;Bi) = y . The disagreement point of the buyer is
zero, because once inside the local market, the buyer can trade only with the
seller. The disagreement point of the seller is given by max V (S;B i) - the
maximum total value of the good to the seller and the set of other buyers.
This denition of the sellers threat point assumes that each player has a
conservative assessment about how well their opponent will be rewarded in
the event of a disagreement.
The surplus of a match is divided by the Mortensen rule. The axioms
are as follows:
 Axiom 1 (local e¢ ciency) The pair of local market participants with
the highest V (S;Bi) form a match if the surplus (S;Bi) is positive.
 Axiom 2 (initiator of the match) The surplus of the match (S;Bi)
is rewarded to the initiator of the match - i.e. the buyer.
Axiom 1 of the Mortensen rule is also common to Nashs solution con-
cept. However, the second axiom is simpler than Nashs other axiom, be-
cause it presumes that the identity of the match initiator is known. The
Mortensen bargaining rule is equivalent to an auction without reserve price
by the seller. In particular, the seller obtains a price y if there are multiple
buyers at his local market and a price of zero otherwise.
The Mortensen rule has important implications for e¢ ciency in match-
ing. Suppose that the number of buyers is determined by free entry, with
each additional buyer to the market paying a capital cost, k. The marginal
social benet of an extra buyer is the extra number of matches created minus
this capital cost. It is easy to verify that
x(N;M)  x(N;M   1) =

N   1
N
M 1
(4.3)
where the right hand side is the probability the buyer is the sole buyer at his
chosen local market. Therefore, the marginal social benet of the extra buyer
4The idea of local markets was advanced by Lucas and Prescott (1974). King and
Grouge (1996) work out the dynamics of this model.
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is equal to the private return to the extra buyer. Thus the Mortensen rule
gives e¢ cient entry in this economy even though the matching technology
does not display constant returns to scale!
4.2 E¢ cient technology dispersion
Consider a simple matching game with a large number of N sellers, M1 bad
buyers and M2 good buyers. The good buyers have valuation of the sellers
good equal to y2; which is greater than the valuation y1 of bad buyers.
Buyers are randomly allocated to sellers. Therefore, if the best matches are
always consummated, the expected value of all the matches is given by
S = N
h
(1  e 2)y2 + (1  e 1)e 2y1
i
(4.4)
where 1 =M1=N and 2 =M2=N . It should be noted that the Hosios rule
cannot be applied to this matching game, because the matching technology
has more than two arguments.
Let m1 and m2 denote the number of bad and good buyers at the lo-
cal market of a seller. Let the set of buyers with low valuation be L =
fB1; B2; ::; Bm1g if m1  1; ; otherwise} and the set of buyers with high
valuation be H = f(Bm1+1; Bm1+2; :::; Bm1+m2) if m2  1; ; otherwise}. In
a local market dened by L and H, the surplus of a match between the seller
S and any particular buyer Bi is given by (S;Bi) = V (S;Bi)  ds(L;H) 
di(L;H);.where the total value of the match is
V (S;Bi) =

y2
y1
if i  m1
if m1 + 1  i  m1 +m2 (4.5)
the disagreement point of the buyer di(L;H) is zero and the disagreement
point of the seller is maxV (S;B i) - the maximum total valuation of the
good to the seller and the set of other buyers in the local market.
The Mortensen rule can also be applied to this game. Suppose we assume
free entry of buyers, where the capital cost of a bad buyer is k1 and the
capital cost of a good buyer is k2. If we assume the technological opportunity
set displays positive but diminishing returns: y1=k1 > y2=k2 and y2   k2 >
y1   k1 The decentralized equilibrium under the Mortensen rule is given by
e 1e 2y2 + e 1(1  e 2)(y2   y1) = k2 (4.6)
and
e 1e 2y1 = k1 (4.7)
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are both positive. In other words, the decentralized equilibrium has tech-
nology dispersion. It is easy to verify that equilibrium is e¢ cient. A social
planner faced with the problem of choosing the number of high and low
valuation buyers to maximize S less the cost of buyers obtains the same
solution as equations (4.6) and (4.7). Therefore, the decentralized economy
has e¢ cient technology dispersion.5
4.3 E¢ cient job creation
The matching problem in the dynamic model of section 3 can be also for-
mulated as a social planning problem. The social planner maximizes
S = max
Et;Et+1
X
tfy(Et +Ht)  kMtg (4.8)
such that Ht = (N   Et)(1  e t) and Et+1 = (1  )(Et +Ht). It is easy
to verify that the solution of this simple dynamic programming problem is
the same as the decentralized economy.
5 On-the-Job Search
The dynamic model in section 3 has employer-employee relationships of ran-
dom but exogenous duration. The duration of relationships can be made
endogenous in a number of ways: economic progress that improves the qual-
ity of new jobs, jobs distinguished by the opportunities to create specic and
general skills, good and bad jobs leading to on-the-job search in the latter.
The important issue is to incorporate these factors into the asset equations
of the dynamic model. This section considers a simple model of on-the-job
search by Julien, Kennes and King (2001), which extends the discussion of
technology dispersion in the last section. This model has directed search,
because on-the-job searchers - workers in bad jobs - receive fewer o¤ers than
workers that are unemployed.6
5.1 The Model
A large number of N identical risk neutral workers face an innite horizon,
perfect capital markets, and a common discount factor . Each worker
5Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) derive related results using a model with non-sequential
search, see also Burdett and Judd (1983). Jansen (1999) considers investments by sellers
and shows that there is no hold up problem, but also no technology dispersion.
6Price posting is considered by Delacroix and Shi (2003).
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has one indivisible unit of labor to sell. At the start of each period, t =
0; 1; 2; 3; :::; there exist E0t unemployed workers, of productivity y0 = 0, and
Eit workers in jobs of productivity yi > 0 where i 2 f1; 2g. The ratio of
good and bad job vacancies to displaced workers at the start of each period
is given by,
it =
Mit
(N   E1t   E2t) (5.1)
and the ratio of good job vacancies to on-the-job searchers (i.e. workers in
bad jobs is given by b2t = cM2tE1t (5.2)
A vacant job has a capital cost of ki such that yi  yj and ki  kj for all
i  j. A match in any period may dissolve in the subsequent period with
xed probability  2 (0; 1):The job vacancies are randomly assigned to job
searchers. Therefore, the number of new hires into good and bad jobs is given
by H2t = (N  E1t E2t)p2t+E1tbp2t and H1t = (N  E1t E2t)p1t E1tbp2t
where p2t = (1   e 2t), p1t = (1   e 1t)e 2t and bp2t = (1   e 2t). The
fraction  of all jobs dissolve in the next period, therefore, the supply of
worker of each type evolves according to the following transition equations:
Eit+1 = (1  )(Eit +Hit) i 2 f1; 2g
The labor market is decentralized with each worker using a second price
auction for their labor services. Within each period, the order of play is as
follows. At the beginning of the period, given the state, new vacancies enter.
Once the number of entrants has been established, vacancies choose which
workers to approach. Once new vacancies have been assigned to candidates,
wages are determined through the auction mechanism. Let it denote the
expected discounted value of a match between an unemployed worker and
a job of productivity yi. The auction implies that the workers share W
j
it is
equal to the value of the workers second best available job o¤er:
W jit = jt (5.3)
where jt is the expected discounted value of a match between an unem-
ployed worker and the workers second best available job. The value of a
displaced worker is given by
Vt = p
0
t0t + p
1
t1t + p
2
t2t (5.4)
where p0t = (1 + 1t + 2t)e
 1te 2t is the probability that a worker has
one or fewer o¤ers, p1t = e
 2t(1   1te 1t   e 1t) + 2te 2t  e 2t is
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the probability of multiple o¤ers only one of which is possibly good p2t =
1   e 2t   2te 2t is the probability of multiple good o¤ers. The prots
from introducing good and bad vacancies directed at unemployed workers
are given by
1t = maxf(1t   0t)q0t   k1; 0g (5.5)
2t = maxf(2t   0t)q0t
+(2t   1t)q1t   k2; 0g (5.6)
where q0t = e
 1te 2t is the probability a displaced worker receives no other
o¤er and q1t = (1   e 1t)e 2t is the probability a good rm faces only a
competing bad rm in its o¤er to an unemployed worker. The prots from
introducing good vacancies directed at workers in bad jobs is given by
b2t = maxf(2t   1t)bq1t   k2; 0g (5.7)
where bq1t = e b2t is the probability a worker is not raided by another good
rm. The assumption of free entry ensures that these values are equal to
zero. The value of a worker that does not nd a match this period is
0t = Vt+1: (5.8)
The value of a high productivity job
2t = y2 + [Vt+1 + (1  )y2] + (5.9)
2(1  p)[Vt+1 + (1  )y2] + :::
The value of a low productivity job
1t = y1 + [Vt+1 + (1  )Xt+1] + (5.10)
2(1  p)[Vt+1 + (1  )Xt+2] + :::
where Xt+1 summarizes three possibilities: the employed worker is not re-
cruited, the worker is recruited by one good job, and the worker is recruited
by multiple high productivity jobs.
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5.2 Equilibrium
It is straight forward to show that the equilibrium has the following proper-
ties: 1. the equilibrium is unique,.2. vacant good jobs are directed at workers
employed in bad jobs if the present value of the sequence of returns equal to
the productivity di¤erence between good and bad jobs discounted by (1 )
is greater than the cost of a good job vacancy (i.e. k2 < y2=(1  (1  )),
3. vacant bad jobs are directed at unemployed workers if the cost of bad job
vacancies if su¢ ciently low,.4. unemployed workers receive more good o¤ers
on average than workers in bad jobs.and 5. the equilibrium is constrained-
e¢ cient.
6 What Makes a Seller?
This section considers the choice of agents to become either buyers or sellers.
Suppose that agents on one side of the market are called reds and that agents
on the other side of the market are called greens. What factors inuence
who buys and who sells? There are two factors to consider - (i) relative
quantities and (ii) relative heterogeneity. Suppose that there are N red
agents and M = N are green agents. The appropriate substititions into
the matching technology given by equation 2.7 reveals
N(1  e )
>
 
<
M(1  e 1=) if 
>
 
<
1 (7.1)
where the left hand side of the implication is the number of matches if green
agents are sellers and the right side is the number of matches if red agents
play this role. Thus, other things equal, buyers should be more scarce than
sellers for e¢ ciency. A second reason that we can consider is heterogeneity.
Consider the case where  = 1. Suppose that red agents are heterogenous -
x good red and (1-x) bad red. Using equation (4.4) it is easy to show
M(1  e x)y2 +M(1  e x)e xy1
> max
1z0
N(1  e z=x)y2 +N(1  e (1 z)=(1 x))y1 (7.2)
where y2 > y1. Thus the e¢ cient outcome is heterogeneous buyers and
homogenous sellers, rather than the other way around.
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7 Wages
The value of jobs in the dynamic model is given as an asset price. This was
done, because the requisite object up for bidding was the present value of the
returns to the match. However, it is straightforward to derive equilibrium
wages. For example, in the model with one type of job, there are two possible
wages given by
j =
wj + V
1  (1  ) (8.1)
where j is the present value of the workers second best o¤er at the time
the wage is negotiated. It is straightforward to extend this exercise to the
model of on-the-job search. The model without on-the-job search is un-
able to produce much wage dispersion, if attention is limited to an economy
that has an unemployment rate of 4 or 5% and jobs of signicant durability
- a separation rate of 4% per month. However, Julien, Kennes and King
(2001) show that the model with on-the-job search can easily account for
the extreme wage disparity in the United States while maintaining the ex-
treme assumption that all workers are identical. Moreover, as implied by
the theory, this extreme wage dispersion is e¢ cient!
There was a major debate about the properties of matching models in
markets where the frictions become innitesimally small (ref: Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1985) and Gale (1985)). This question can be easly studied
in the dynamic competitive auction model by reducing the length of time
between o¤er rounds. A consistent shift of the length of o¤er rounds, 4t;
say from two weeks to one, requires us to appropriately scale the other para-
meters of the model. This scaling is achieved by adjusting the parameters of
the model as follows. In each period, the present value of output produced
and the capital cost of each job - vacant or lled - are given by
y(4t) =
Z t+4t
t
ye (+r)tdt (8.2)
and
k(4t) =
Z t+4t
t
ke rtdt: (8.3)
Likewise, the discount rate and separation rates are given by (4t) = e r4t
and (4t) = 1  e 4t. Besides being able to illustrate how the Beveridge
curve shifts right or left as the size of the friction falls, we can also look at
the limiting properties of this economy. In the limit as 4t ! 0, there is
a nite ratio of job searchers to job vacancies, the number of job searcher
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approach zero. Moreover, the wage to a worker is equal to the output of the
economy less the capital cost and jobs are paid their capital cost. Therefore,
the frictionless economy is Walrasian.7
8 Price Posting
Hosios (1990) considers a simple model of job entry, based upon Peters model
of price posting with capacity constraints. He shows that the equilibrium
wage has the following property
w = X1=X (9.1)
where the function X is the matching technology given in equation 2.7. A
neat implication is the equivalence of auctions and posted prices (e.g. Kultti
1999). Coles and Eeckhout (2001) show the use of auctions or price posting
is indeterminate in a simple game with homogenous buyers and sellers.8
The price posting model runs into di¢ culty with heterogenous buyers.
In this case, Shi (2004) shows that if there are two types of buyers then
the equilibrium must have each seller posting two posted prices - one for
each type of buyer. Besides the uncertain practical relevance of such pricing
structures, the model is especially complicated to solve. In other words the
apparent simplicity of price posting is limited by the existence of heteroge-
nous buyers. A similar criticism can be made of model of competitive search
(e.g. Moen 1997).
Perhaps the ultimate reason for the existsence of markets with compet-
itive auctions is ex post heterogeneity driven by nature. Thus the early
applications of competitive auctions by Wolinsky (1987) and McAfee (1990)
have this feature. Ex post uncertainty is conceptually simple to introduce
although it can be mathematically taxing because we must keep track of
the statistics for the rst and second highest valuations at each local market
as a function of the heterogenous number of bidders as is implied by the
exponential matching function.9 These results are slightly beyond the scope
of the present discussion and serve mainly to connect the results of competi-
tive auctions more closely to the existing auction literature.10 However, the
7See Sakovics et al (2001) consider a slightly di¤erent analysis, although their matching
technology is not exactly the same as under investigation here.
8 (see also Julien, Kennes and King 2001
9Papers by Peters and Severinov (1997) and Peters (1997a,b) are highly recommended
introductions to these topics.
10A simple approach to the decision problem created by endogenous entry of buyers is
given by McAfee and McMillan (1985).
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goal of this paper has been to be more focused on the literature on match-
ing, which usually treats heterogeneity quite simply, and which we believe
is beneted most by the realism that competing auction theory provides.
9 Imperfect Information
The theory of competitive auctions implies a shift in focus from imperfect
information about buyers to imperfect information about sellers. On the one
hand, the problem of informational ine¢ ciency concerning buyers is solved
by the auction and thus the high valuation buyer is always rewarded the
good for sale at a price equal to the second highest valuation. On the other
hand, the sellersproblem of attracting buyers gives them much incentive
to advertise themselves as good - a classic lemons problem. Kennes and
Schi¤ (2003) consider the equilibrium e¤ects of exogenously lifting the veil of
ignorance about the quality of sellers. However, there are many applications
in which information about sellers is revealed endogenously. Examples of
such market mechanisms include reputation systems, accreditation services,
and guidebooks,
9.1 The model
Suppose that sellers are separated by some mechanism into two quality dif-
ferentiated submarkets. Let ql and qh denote the expected quality levels of
sellers in the two submarkets, and let  denote the fraction of sellers that
are allocated to the submarket with expected quality qh. Without loss of
generality we assume qh > ql. Buyers are informed of ql, qh and . If sellers
are separated in such a manner, the average quality of sellers across submar-
kets cannot change, thus eq = qh + (1  ) ql.:In addition, the number of
buyers is xed, so market tightness for each submarket is related to overall
market tightness as follows:  = h + (1  )l,where l and h denote
the buyer-seller ratios of the two submarkets. The division of sellers into
submarkets leads to two basic types of equilibrium distribution of buyers
across the submarkets. These distributions depend upon the average qual-
ity of sellers in each submarket, their relative numbers, and the overall ratio
of buyers to sellers. These conditions are summarized by what we call the
exclusion constraint :
qhe
 =  ql. (10.1)
The left hand side of the exclusion constraint is the expected utility of
a buyer if all buyers locate in the high quality submarket. The right hand
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side of this constraint is the expected quality of sellersproducts in the low
quality submarket. If (10.1) is satised, a buyer is better o¤ to locate in
the high quality submarket even though if he located in the low quality
submarket he would not have to compete with any other buyers and could
obtain a payo¤ of ql with certainty. Thus if the partition of sellers into
submarkets satises (6.1), all buyers locate in the high quality submarket so
that h = = and l = 0. If the partition of sellers into submarkets does
not satisfy (10.1), buyers locate in both the high quality and low quality
submarkets. In a mixed strategy equilibrium where (10.1) is not satised,
we must have
qhe
 h = qle l . (10.2)
That is, the expected utility to buyers must be the same from locating in
either submarket. The behavior of buyers can therefore be expressed as a
function of the distribution of sellers over the submarkets. This function
depends crucially on (10.1). From  = h + (1  )l and (10.2), market
tightness in the high and low quality submarkets are given by
h =
(
= if EC
+ (1  ) ln

qh
ql

otherwise
. (10.3)
and
l =
(
0 if EC
   ln

qh
ql

otherwise
. (10.4)
If (10.1) holds, sellers in the low quality submarket are excluded, a buyers
utility in any period is simply U = e =qh. If (EC) does not hold, buyers
visit both submarkets with strictly positive probability and from (10.2), a
buyers utility in any period is U = e hqh. Substituting in  = h +
(1  )l, for any distribution of sellers across submarkets, the expected
payo¤ of a buyer when search is guided is given by
U =

e =qh if EC
e qhq
1 
l otherwise
. (10.5)
The utility of buyers is a linear function of the expected quality of sellers
in the high submarket if sellers in the low submarket are excluded. If no
sellers are excluded, the utility of buyers is a Cobb-Douglas function of the
expected qualities of the sellersproducts in each submarket with the weights
being the fraction of sellers in each submarket.
This model has some surprising results for the distribution benets of
being better informed. Suppose that buyers are made measurably better
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informed about seller qualities, but not so well informed as to induce total
exclusion of these sellers. In this case, we can compare welfare, with and
without guided search as follows
U   U0 = e qhq1 l   e eq
= e 

qhq
1 
l   (qh + (1  ) ql)

< 0 for all qh 6= ql and  2 (0; 1): (6.5)
To see the inequality, note that in general, xy1  < x + (1  ) y for
 2 (0; 1) and x 6= y. Taking the log of the left-hand side, log  xy1  =
 log x+ (1  ) log y < log (x+ (1  ) y) since log is a concave function,
and log monotone implies xy1  < x + (1  ) y. Thus the provision
of information about sellers hurts buyers since it forces them to compete
more intensely for high quality products - thus, in equilibrium, the price of
high quality goods increases more than the probability of trade with such
sellers.11 However, Kennes and Schi¤ (2003) also show that making buyers
better informed about scarce good sellers, such that buyers exclude bad
sellers, can make them better o¤.
Another feature of the decentralized economy in this model is that in-
formation is used e¢ ciently. This can be seen by setting up the social
planning problem and determining the social planner preferred values of
h; l. Therefore, this model is especially useful for the study of reputation
systems - algorithms that transfer information across periods. In particular,
it means that we concentrate our attention on the specic implications of
alternative reputation systems, without adding the assumption about other
sources of unrelated ine¢ ciency.
10 Further Applications
This section discusses a number of applications of the theory of competitive
auctions. This section is meant to be suggestive of the kind of research that
can be pursued. Most of the research described in this section is either very
recent, works in progress, or in some cases, speculative.
Albrecht,Gautier and Vroman (2003) consider a model that combines
elements of wage posting and bidding for Labor. They assume, like Burdett
Shi and Wright (2001) that rms post wages. They also assume that workers
apply to more than one job. This model is useful for the purpose of studying
11Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) derive essentially the opposite result, because search
in their model is undirected.
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two sided search. An interesting outcome of the model is that the posted
wages of rms are driven to zero if they must bid for workers that apply to
multiple positions. Therefore, the simple bidding for labor model presented
in section 3 is the equilibrium outcome of their more elaborate game.
The problem of assortative matching was studied by Shimer and Smith
(2000) in a random matching model. The basic idea is that individuals are
not always matched to their best jobs. This question can be easily addressed
with the model of on-the-job search if we simply assume rms can distinguish
between alternative types of labor (e.g. sex, race, schooling, etc.). Shimer
(2001) also considers a related competitive auction model where heteroge-
nous workers compete for heterogenous jobs. Moreover, Coles and Eeckhout
(2000) show an interesting limiting property that perfect coordination can
be achieved by su¢ cient heterogeneity on both sides of the market.12
Jovanovic and Rosseau (2004) consider an application in which the as-
sembly of the rm is done by managers who take part in auctions. The
model explains movements in product and technology variety since 1990.
They argue that rise in the rm specicity of capital explains why (i) labor
turnover has declined dramatically, (ii) rms now get a larger fraction of
rents, (iii) Tobins Q is positively related to the skill premium, (iv) stock
prices often rise with no accompanying rise in productivity and (v) man-
agement and venture capitalism play more important roles in running the
rm.
Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) consider the possibility that some rms
may have capacity to hire more than one worker. They show that this feature
inuence the structure of the equilibrium matching technology. The idea of
giving more capacity than the other side of the market - the workers - is
closely related to the idea that sellers are more scarce than buyers presented
in section 7. Thus one explanation for why rms sell jobs is that rms
are more scarce than workers. Of course the fact rms sell multiple units
limits the importance of auctions - McAfee and McMillan (1987) suggest
that auctions are best used where the seller has a single unit. Therefore
capacity choices could explain why rms do not auction their jobs as in
Shimer (1996, 1999, 2001).
Kennes and Schi¤ consider the modelling of reputation systems. In the
competitive auction model, information is used e¢ ciently. This outcome is
useful for the study of reputation systems that economize on the amount of
information transferred across periods in order to maximize transparency.
12This result requires the public observation of all the relevant characteristics of sellers,
in addition to their pricing mechanisms.
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Thus Kennes and Schi¤ consider alternative reputation systems that report
only a simple metric (eq recommended =1 or not recommended=0). The
problem in choosing a simple reputation system is that a stand must be taken
on what is important for the determination of the 1s and 0s. There are
several alternative reputation systems that could be used. For example, in
a market with many anonymous buyers and sellers, one type of reputation
system could track whether a seller was honest in the past. Therefore,
dishonestly - she is dirty rotten liar - would count as a strike against the
seller yielding a 0 while honesty would yield a 1. Alternatively, a reputation
system might report something about the quality of the past transaction.
For example, a bad transaction - she sold me a piece of crap - would count
as a strike against the seller yielding a 0 while the alternative would yield a
1. How do the two simple reputation systems di¤er in practice? On the one
hand, a reputation system that screens for honesty allows good sellers to do
the right thing and signal their type in the relatively rare events that they
have low quality products to sell. Thus the market introduces information
about seller quality at very early periods in a sellers tenure. However, the
potential downside of a reputation system for honesty is that bad sellers
may almost mimic this strategy in order to delay the public realization that
they are bad type. If this bait and switch strategy by bad sellers is optimal,
the gains from signalling are reduced and a reputation system for honesty
is potentially ine¢ cient.
In the section on imperfect information, we also argued that there are
redistributional e¤ects of third party information, which may hurt buyers.
This raises questions about how information is sold. In Kennes and Schi¤
(2003c) it is assumed that there are two methods of information distribution:
guidebooks and accreditation services. The assumption is also made that
guidebook and accreditation services have a number of independent costs.
On the one hand, a guidebook service must exclude some buyers in order
to be commercially viable. In particular, the exclusion of third party infor-
mation from some buyers in favor of others requires the costly creation and
distribution of guidebooks. However, such costly exclusion of information
is not necessary for the operation of an accreditation service. On the other
hand, an accreditation service bears the costs of marketing itself to the sell-
ers and creating an atmosphere of trust. It is not necessary for a third party
to convince sellers of its worth in the case of guidebooks. Thus a guidebook
service avoids such costs.Kennes and Schi¤ show that the market structure
is an important determinant of the optimal method of guided search. In
particular, market, where buyers as a group are hurt by information are
likely to be served by an accreditation service. On the other hand, a market
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where buyers are benets as a group are likely to be served by a guidebook.
Filges, Kennes, Larsen and Tranæs (2004) use an auction model to study
labor market policy. One observation that they make is that cross country
spending on labor market policies is independent of the unemployment rate.
This observation presents di¢ culties for any theory that attempts to paint
the use of labor market policy with a broad brush theory with homogenous
workers and rms. Therefore, Filges et al use an auction model to work out
labor market policy in labor market with heterogenous workers and oppor-
tunities for training. The model is able to explain the strong correlation
between active and passive subsidies in the data. The basic mechanism
is that increases in passive policies weaken the incentive compatibility con-
straint on training subsidies. Therefore higher quality training programs can
be implemented without leading advantaged to also choose these programs.
The dynamic adjustment of unemployment and vacancies can be easily
modelled by a Markov process for the productivity of jobs (ref: Kennes
2004). If on-the-job search is introduced into this model as I did in section
5, one might expect that the model can account for the unexplained low
variation in vacancies that exists in Shimers (2004) calibration of a search
model without on-the-job search.
The sale of another form of asset, money, might also be modelled by the
assumption that trade is a competitive auction. For example, Rocheteau
and Wright (2004).present a model of money with competitive search. As
discussed, such a model assumes buyers are homogenous. Thus the com-
petitive auction model could introduce this type of heterogeneity into their
framework. This might matter for e¢ ciency, because we have argued that
heterogenous agent should be buyers rather than sellers, other things equal.
Finally, recent developments by Eaton and Kortum (2002) are highly
suggestive of a theory of competitive auctions applied to international trade.
In their model, countries receive technology draws - valuations - in other
countries. In equilibrium, the country with the lowest cost draw produces.
It seems possible to introduce uncoordinated investments into this frame-
work as in Jovanovic and Rosseau (2003). Such a model could endogenize
investments as a function of ex ante observable di¤erences across countries.
11 Conclusions
Having written this paper in Denmark, I feel at liberty to cite Hans Chris-
tian Andersen. Two of his stories come to mind: "The Emperors New
Clothes" and "The Ugly Ducking". The price posting model of coordina-
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tion frictions fails for the simple reason that its main assumption is false. In
the real world, the sellers of specialized labor do not make wage demands
in their resumes. Nor do the sellers of specialized jobs set wages in their
job advertisements. Thus the emperor has no clothes. Likewise, the the-
ory of competitive auctions has been criticized, or even ignored, because it
appears too complex. Therefore, price posting models have been advanced
for their simplicity, despite their questionable assumptions. However, these
same models quickly become intractable, or yield questionable results, when
they are applied to key problems such as on-the-job search, and worker and
rm heterogeneity. By contrast, the theory of competitive auctions o¤ers a
tractable alternative with generally sensibe results. Thus this ugly ducking
of the matching literature may yet prove to be a beautiful swan.
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